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IMPLICIT BIAS IN LEGAL INTERPRETATION
Ward Farnsworth, Dustin Guzior and Anup Malani1
What role do policy preferences play when a judge or any other reader decides what a statute
or other legal text means? Most judges think of themselves as doing law, not politics. Yet the
observable decisions that judges make often follow patterns that are hard to explain by anything other
than policy preferences. Indeed, if one presses the implications of the data too hard, it is likely to be
heard as an accusation of bad faith—a claim that the judge or other decision-maker isn’t really earnest
in trying to separate preference from judgment. This does not advance the discussion, and distracts
from the possibility of more interesting explanations. A promising antidote, we believe, lies in
empirical study not just of large numbers of judicial decisions collected over time, as previous scholars
have done, but of the immediate experience of legal interpretation.
We compile, and here present, rich evidence of what happens when lawyers in training are
asked in controlled surveys to distinguish between their policy preferences on the one hand and their
own interpretive judgments or predictions about courts judgments on the other. Our findings offer
two lessons. First and foremost, they suggest that separating policy preferences from judgments
about the meaning of statutes is very difficult. The same is true of preferences and predictions about
what courts will do: respondents tend to predict that courts will do what the respondents themselves
prefer. The fundamental entanglement of preferences and interpretation raises important questions
about the ability of anyone – including judges – to neutrally carry out interpretive strategies meant to
generate answers in close cases. Second, however, the results also show that certain ways of framing
the interpretive question can reduce the influence of preference on interpretation—though perhaps
not its effect on predictions. Instead of simply asking respondents how they would interpret the text
of a statute or how the drafters would likely want it applied, it is better to ask respondents how
ordinary readers would interpret the statute. This framing of the interpretative question can debias an
individual’s interpretation of a statute.
In short, interpretative theories that elevate text alone or give the intent of drafters are both
susceptible to contamination by private preferences. To immunize interpretation from these
preferences, a theory that asks how ordinary readers would read a statute may be the best prescription.
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INTRODUCTION
What role do policy preferences play when a judge or any other reader
decides what a statute or other legal text means? This is a stubborn problem in the
study of legal interpretation, and it continues to provoke blunt disagreement at the
highest levels of the profession. The Chief Justice of the United States says that his
job when deciding cases is to ―call balls and strikes‖;2 his claim is ridiculed by
distinguished legal scholars and others.3 Prominent academics publish studies
suggesting that judges’ views of policy play an important role in their decisions;4
prominent judges deny it and complain that the studies do not take seriously enough
the reports that the judges themselves make of their own thinking.5
Even within the academy, those studies suggesting that close cases are
decided according to the ideologies of the judges are open to controversy.
Academics who accept the influence of ideology debate whether its effect is large or
small,6 and meanwhile much scholarship on legal interpretation continues to be
premised on the opposite vision.7 That scholarship considers at length when only
the text of a statute should be considered by a judge, and when other evidence
should be taken into account—all of this based impliedly or explicitly on the idea
that judges might carry out such decisions in a straightforward way that does not give
effect to their preferences.
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005).
3 See Richard A. Posner, Some Realism About Judges: A Reply to Edwards and Livermore, 59 Duke L.J. 1177
(2010) (calling Roberts’s analogy ―ludicrous‖ and ―ridiculous‖); Erwin Chemerinsky, Seeing the
Emperor's Clothes: Recognizing the Reality of Constitutional Decision Making, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 1069,
1069 (2006) (―it is hard to think of a less apt analogy‖).
4 See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1717
(1997); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine:
Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 Yale L.J. 2155 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Are
Judges Political?: An Empirical Analysis of the Federal Judiciary 150 (2006).
5 Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1335 (1998);
Patricia M. Wald, A Response to Tiller and Cross, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 235 (1999); Harry T. Edwards and
Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate
Decisionmaking, 58 Duke L.J. 1895 (2009).
6 See, e.g., Gregory C. Sisk and Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic Debates About
Statistical Measures, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 743 (2005); Frank B. Cross, Decision Making in U.S. Courts of
Appeals (2007).
7 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (1997); Jonathan T.
Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (2006); John F. Manning, What Divides
Textualists from Purposivists? 106 Colum. L. Rev. 70 (2006).
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These conflicts about how judges do their job are stubborn for
understandable reasons. Most judges think of themselves as doing law, not politics.
They do not want to give effect to their policy preferences, so they decide not to,
and they think that they aren’t. That inner feeling of legalism is convincing and
tenacious, and it is not limited to judges. It is common enough for most people
deciding contentious legal questions to feel that they are doing law and that their
adversaries are doing politics. Yet the resulting decisions that judges make often
follow patterns that are observable from the outside and seem hard to explain by
anything other than policy preferences. There is, in other words, a discrepancy
between the subjective experience of legal decision-making and objective
observations of the results. Subjective feelings are slow to yield in such a contest, so
it is no surprise that judges dispute the implications of objective studies. Indeed, if
one presses the implications of the data too hard, it is likely to be heard as an
accusation of bad faith—a claim that the judge or other decision-maker isn’t really
earnest in trying to separate preference from judgment. This does not advance the
discussion, and distracts from the possibility of more interesting explanations.
A promising antidote, we believe, lies in empirical study not just of large
numbers of judicial decisions collected over time, as previous scholars have done,
but of the immediate experience of legal interpretation. What happens when people
are asked to interpret legal texts while keeping their preferences out of it? If we take
simple tasks of separation—here, separation of preference from judgment in a legal
setting—and we instruct people to carry them out, how well can they do it? Do their
preferences affect their readings anyway?
These are not specifically questions about what judges can do. They are
questions about what anyone can do; they are questions about cognition, not the
judicial role. But they may have implications for the judicial role. Judges are human,
and what they (or anyone) can do has implications for the scope of their charge and
how they should try to carry it out. Moreover, the questions about bias and
cognition are central to—even if they remain largely latent in—academic debates
over legal interpretation. Mostly they bubble just under the surface and as yet they
have been the subject of no direct inquiry.
This Article starts that project. It cannot directly settle the question of how
judges carry out those tasks, because large-scale controlled experiments involving
judges are difficult to carry out. We instead sought to compile, and here present, rich
evidence of what happens when lawyers in training are asked in controlled surveys to
distinguish between their policy preferences on the one hand and their own
interpretive judgments or predictions about courts judgments on the other.
Our findings offer two lessons. First and foremost, they suggest that
separating policy preferences from judgments about the meaning of statutes is very
difficult. The same is true of preferences and predictions about what courts will do:
respondents tend to predict that courts will do what the respondents themselves
prefer. The fundamental entanglement of preferences and interpretation raises
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important questions about the ability of judges (or anyone) to neutrally carry out
interpretive strategies meant to generate answers in close cases. It also illustrates
subtle and significant challenges to the lawyer’s role in attempting to provide
accurate advice about the law to clients.
Second, however, the results also show that certain ways of framing the
interpretive question can reduce the influence of preference on interpretation—
though perhaps not its effect on predictions. The key is to start with a non-idealized,
external reference point for making the interpretive judgment. Instead of simply
asking respondents how they would interpret the text of a statute or how the drafters
would likely want it applied, respondents are better asked how ordinary readers
would interpret statute. When this is done, the influence of a respondent’s
preferences on interpretation subsides. In short, proper framing of the interpretative
question can debias an individual’s interpretation of a statute.
Our findings, then, are not only cautionary; they also have suggestions to
offer about how to reduce unwanted influences on anyone’s reasoning about what an
ambiguous statute means. Interpretative theories that elevate text alone or give the
intent of drafters are both susceptible to contamination by private preferences. To
immunize interpretation from these preferences, a theory that asks how ordinary
readers would read a statute may be the best prescription. Unfortunately there is no
comparably straightforward remedy for bias in predictions about the behavior of
judges. And since common models of settlement suggest that conflicting predictions
among parties drive litigation behavior, our findings suggest a new explanation for
why parties often fail to settle.
Section I of this paper describes our survey instrument. Section II describes
the results. Section III discusses the implications for interpretative theory. Section
IV addresses some limitations, and the final section offers concluding thoughts.
I. METHODOLOGY
We proceeded by creating survey instruments and administering them to
over 1500 law students, most of them in their first semester of study.8 In each
survey, the respondent was presented with ambiguous statutes and facts to which
they might apply. The statutes and facts were taken from Supreme Court cases
involving federal criminal law or civil disputes. The respondents were told what
position each side to the case took.
The questions then put to them took various forms. First, the respondents
were asked what outcome of the case they preferred as a matter of policy, setting
aside the text of the statute. Then they were asked to interpret the text of the statute,
setting aside their policy preferences. Each respondent was asked this question in
The latest surveys were administered to first year law students at Boston University and University
of Chicago during the 2010-2011 academic year.
8
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different ways. Some were asked which reading of the text they thought was the best
fit to its ordinary meaning; others were asked which reading ordinary readers of
English would think the best fit to its ordinary meaning; and yet others were asked
which reading they thought was the best fit to the drafters’ intent. Finally,
respondents were asked on occasion to predict which reading a court would prefer.
The goal, of course, was to find any relationships between answers to the question
about policy preferences and answers to the interpretive and predictive questions.
As we shall see, policy preferences seem to affect them all—but not to the same
extent.
A. Cases
Each of our surveys contained questions about a number of different
statutory cases. The results from the surveys were highly repetitive from case to case,
so we review in detail four of the cases from our most recent survey instruments.
The first case (―Gun use case‖) was based on Smith v. United States, 508 U.S.
223 (1993). 9
A federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), provides an enhanced prison sentence for anyone who
―uses‖ a firearm ―in relation to . . . a drug trafficking offense.‖ Defendant, a drug dealer,
owned a gun. He approached a confederate and offered to trade him the gun for some
cocaine. His confederate turned out to be an undercover police officer, and defendant was
arrested. He was charged with violating 924(c). Defendant did not brandish the gun or use
it in a threatening manner, but he did offer it as an item of barter.
The question is whether offering the gun in trade was a ―use‖ of it within the meaning of
924(c) (in which case the defendant gets the extra time on his prison sentence). Defendant's
reading is that offering a gun in trade is not a ―use.‖ The government's reading is that it is a
―use.‖

The second case (―Child pornography case‖), adapted from United States v. X-Citement
Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994),10 was somewhat more complicated.
A federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2252, reads in part as follows:
(a) Any person who—
(1) knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce by any means
including by computer or mails, any visual depiction, if—

The Court held, 6-3, in favor of the government.
The Court held, 7-2, that the government had to prove that the defendant knew that the films he
sold included sexually explicit acts by minors. We presented the case to our respondents in a form a
bit different, and a bit simpler, than the form it took in the Supreme Court. In the actual X-Citement
Video case, it was the defendant who argued that the scienter requirement did not reach the age of the
performers in the movies—because he claimed this made the statute unconstitutional. Since we did
not wish to engage the constitutional question, we wrote the survey question to suggest that the
defendant argued for a reading of the statute that made it harder to get a conviction under it.
9

10
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(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct;
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
The defendant was accused of violating the statute by selling pornographic videotapes that
included footage of a woman who was under the age of 18, and thus was a minor. He
defended on the ground that when he sold the tape, he did not know the person on the tape
was a minor.
The question is whether the word ―knowingly‖ in section (1) applies to the phrase ―the use
of a minor‖ in section (1)(a). The defendant's reading is that ―knowingly‖ does modify ―the
use of a minor.‖ The government's reading is that ―knowingly‖ does not modify ―the use of
a minor.‖

The third case (―False statements case‖) was based on United States v. Yermian, 468
U.S. 63 (1984).11
The federal ―false statements‖ statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, says:
Whoever knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick,
scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent
statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document
knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, if
the matter lies within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United
States, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.
The defendant worked for a company that had a contract with the Department of Defense.
The company asked him to fill out a questionnaire to obtain a security clearance. He did so.
His company mailed the questionnaire to the Department of Defense. The Department
discovered that the defendant's answers contained false statements. He was charged with
violating the statute quoted above. His defense was that he had not realized that his
questionnaire would be forwarded to the government.
The question is whether the statute requires proof that a defendant knew the matter in
question was within the jurisdiction of a government agency. The defendant's reading is that
the statute does require such proof. The government's reading is that it does not require
such proof.

The final case (―Attorney’s fees‖ case) was a civil case based on West Virginia Univ.
Hospitals v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
A federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, provides in relevant part: "In any action or proceeding to
enforce a provision of section 1983 of this title, the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party [to recover from the losing party] a reasonable attorney's fee as part of its
costs." Plaintiff brought a successful lawsuit against the government to enforce section 1983
and sought to recover fees paid to experts who advised his attorney.

The Court held for the government, 5-4, that knowledge of the federal agency’s jurisdiction on
Yermian’s part was not needed to support his conviction.
11
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The question is whether fees paid to experts by an attorney are covered by the part of § 1988
allowing recovery of "a reasonable attorney's fee." The defendant's reading is that fees of
experts who advise an attorney are not covered by § 1988. The plaintiff's reading is that
experts' fees are covered.

B. Questions
After presenting facts from one of the cases above, the survey asked each
respondent about her policy preference:
Setting aside the text of the statute, who do you think should win as a matter of policy
preference?
(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)

I strongly prefer that the defendant win
I mildly prefer that the defendant win
I mildly prefer that the government win
I strongly prefer that the government win

Each respondent was also asked whether the defendant or the government’s reading
of the statute was better.12 This question was asked in different ways. Some
respondents were asked:
Setting your policy preference aside, which reading better fits the ordinary meaning of the
statute’s text?
(A) The defendant’s reading.
(B) Probably the defendant’s reading.
(C) Probably the government’s reading.
(D) The government’s reading.

We will refer to the question just shown above as the ―ordinary meaning‖ question.
Some respondents were instead asked a different question that we will call ―drafters’
intent‖:
Setting your policy preference aside, which reading of the statute is a better fit to what the
drafters of the statute intended?
(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)

The defendant’s reading.
Probably the defendant’s reading.
Probably the government’s reading.
The government’s reading.

Finally other respondents were asked an ―ordinary readers‖ question:
Setting your policy preference aside, which reading of the statute would ordinary readers of
English think is a better fit to the ordinary meaning of the statute’s text?

In describing the survey we present the interpretive question after the preference question. Later
we will present the predictive question. When we administered the survey, however, we mixed up the
order of the questions across cases. Thus, for some cases the preference question followed the
interpretive question and for others the predictive question preceded the other two. We did this to
determine if the order of questions affected answers. We found that it did not.
12
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(A) The defendant’s reading.
(B) Probably the defendant’s reading.
(C) Probably the government’s reading.
(D) The government’s reading.

Finally, after the gun use case in particular, respondents were asked about how they
predict a court would interpret the statute:
Which side’s reading do you predict that a court would agree with?
(A) The defendant’s reading.
(B) Probably the defendant’s reading.
(C) Probably the government’s reading.
(D) The government’s reading.

We thus recorded policy preferences for everyone, and examined the relationship
between those preferences and the answers given to the other questions.
II. RESULTS
A. The influence of preferences on interpretation
Figures 1-4 describe for the four cases the correlation between respondents’
preferences and their answers to the different versions of the interpretive question.
The horizontal axis lines up respondents according to their policy preferences about
the outcome of the case (from those who strongly preferred that the defendant win
to those who strongly preferred that the government win). The vertical axis shows
which side’s reading the respondents thought were best in reply to the various
interpretive questions we asked. We coded the reading from 1 to 4, where 4
indicates the most the most pro-government. Using this scale, each line presents the
average answer to an interpretive question among respondents with a given policy
preference. The whiskers present the 95% confidence interval for each average.
The basic pattern is obvious enough. Respondents’ judgments about the
ordinary meaning of the statute’s text and about the drafters’ intent are highly
correlated with their policy preferences—even though the respondents were
instructed to set those preferences aside. The one remarkable exception is the
question about which side’s interpretation ordinary readers would think better fits the
ordinary meaning of the statute’s text. The answers to that question are significantly
less correlated with respondents’ policy preferences in every case. These results are
confirmed in the regression analysis reported in Table 1.13 Let us consider each of
these findings in detail.

The regression is described in the note under the table. The important finding is that the
coefficients on the interactions between policy preference on the one hand and ordinary readers or
drafters intent questions on the other hand are positive and statistically significant in each regression.
13
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Gun Use
Government

Reading

Probably
Government

Probably
Defendant

Ordinary meaning
Drafters' intent
Ordinary readers

Defendant
Defendant

Probably
Defendant

Probably
Government

Government

Policy preference

Figure 1. Correlation between policy preference and interpretation in the gun use case.

Child Pornography
Government

Reading

Probably
Government

Probably
Defendant

Ordinary meaning
Drafters' intent
Ordinary readers

Defendant
Defendant

Probably
Defendant

Probably
Government

Government

Policy preference

Figure 2. Correlation between policy preference and interpretation
This implies that in every case policy preferences have significantly more influence in the ordinary
meaning and drafters’ intent questions than in the ordinary readers question.
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in the child pornography case.

False Statement
Government

Reading

Probably
Government

Probably
Defendant

Ordinary meaning
Drafters' intent
Ordinary readers

Defendant
Defendant

Probably
Defendant

Probably
Government

Government

Policy preference

Figure 3. Correlation between policy preference and interpretation in the false statement case.

Attorney's Fees
Government

Reading

Probably
Government

Probably
Defendant

Ordinary meaning
Drafters' intent
Ordinary readers

Defendant
Defendant

Probably
Defendant

Probably
Government

Government

Policy preference

Figure 4. Correlation between policy preference and interpretation in the attorney's fees case.
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Table 1. Regression analysis of correlation between policy preference and interpretation.
Attorney
Child porn False state
Gun use
All
fees
Constant
Ordinary meaning
Drafters' intent
Policy preference
Policy preference
x Ordinary meaning
Policy preference

1.975***

1.857***

1.782***

1.990***

1.840***

(0.184)

(0.238)

(0.153)

(0.185)

(0.114)

-0.733***

-0.774**

-0.383*

-0.477*

-0.650***

(0.263)

(0.326)

(0.221)

(0.265)

(0.159)

-0.211

-0.262

-0.540**

-0.647***

-0.418***

(0.269)

(0.329)

(0.221)

(0.232)

(0.151)

0.167***

0.316***

0.261***

0.066

0.209***

(0.060)

(0.076)

(0.057)

(0.077)

(0.041)

0.308***

0.347***

0.170**

0.314***

0.322***

(0.085)

(0.105)

(0.083)

(0.106)

(0.057)

0.176**

0.195*

0.236***

0.373***

0.269***

x Drafters' intent

(0.087)

(0.108)

(0.081)

(0.103)

(0.054)

Number of observations

796

446

796

450

1,786

Adjusted R2
0.121
0.249
0.152
0.128
0.184
Note. Table reports results from a regression of answers to the interpretive question on
indicators for how the interpretive question was framed, policy preference, and indicators for
framing interacted with policy preference. Omitted category is ordinary readers question.
Interpretation and policy preference are measured on a 1 - 4 scale, with 4 most favoring the
government. The regression was run once for answers for each case (first 4 columns), and then
for answers from all cases pooled together (last column). Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses below coefficients. ***/**/* indicate p < 0.01/0.05/<0.1 without adjustment for
multiple testing.

1. Ordinary meaning
The results with respect to the ordinary meaning question are stark.
Judgments about the ordinary meaning of a text are highly entwined with policy
preferences about the outcome of the case the text is being used to decide. What
makes the finding especially striking is that the respondents were explicitly told to
separate the two considerations. They could not do it.
This failure has several implications. First and most simply, personal
statements about what the ―ordinary meaning‖ of a text seems to be are highly prone
to bias by the policy preferences of whoever is making the claim. Second, the
makers of such claims are not likely to subjectively experience themselves as biased
in this way. Their intentions were otherwise. The influence exerts itself invisibly.
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2. Drafters’ intent
The same pattern appears in answers to the drafters’ intent question.14 We
thought it possible that separating oneself a bit from the question of the statute’s
meaning—being asked not what you think it means, but you believe the author
wanted—might reduce the influence of one’s own policy preferences. Unfortunately
it does not. Estimates of the drafters’ intent, like judgments about ordinary meaning,
closely track the respondents’ own wishes.
One reason for this result might be that respondents project their own
preferences onto the legislators who they imagine drafted the bill. Here as with the
first question, the projection evidently is unconscious, for again the respondents
were told to put their preferences aside when answering the question.
We have wondered whether the answer to the drafters’ intent question might
help explain the answers to the previous one about which reading of the text best fits
its ordinary meaning. Maybe one reason policy preferences are bound up with
replies to the ordinary meaning question is that people try to determine ordinary
meaning by guessing at what the drafters of the statute must have meant, and they
can only make headway on that question by asking what they themselves would have
wanted if they had been the drafters. This may be part of the story, but it can’t be all
of it, because the responses to the ―ordinary meaning‖ question and the ―drafters’
intent‖ sometimes were different in significant ways.
The difference between the ―ordinary meaning‖ question and the ―drafters’
intent‖ question is nicely illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. Looking at the left half of
each chart—that is, to those respondents who preferred that the defendant win—we
find that people answering the ―drafters’ intent‖ question side with the government
more quickly than people just saying which view of the text better fits its ordinary
meaning. In the child pornography case (Fig. 2), 89% of those respondents who
strongly preferred that the defendant win thought the defendant’s reading better fit
the statute’s ―ordinary meaning.‖ By contrast, only 67% of that group thought the
defendant’s reading better fit the ―drafters’ intent‖. That is a significant shift in the
government’s favor. Respondents who mildly preferred that the defendant win
exhibited the same shift: 79% of them thought the defendant’s reading better fit the
statute’s ordinary meaning, while only 42% of them thought the defendant’s reading
better fit the drafters’ intent.15 Overall, 22% of respondents who strongly preferred
It might seem that our respondents were not in a good position to comment on the intent of those
who drafted the statutes they read. They did not have any statements from the legislative history, or
any information about what events caused the statute to be drafted, or any knowledge of the rest of
the surrounding legal context. Still, some courts like to say that the best evidence of a legislature’s
intent is the words they chose to use, see, e.g., U.S. v. Husted, 545 F.3d 1240, 1246 (10th Cir. 2008),
so perhaps our survey-takers were not entirely disarmed. At any rate, we meant the question mostly
as a heuristic.
15 We see the same shifts when we look at the False Statement Case (Figure 3). In that case, the shift
for respondents who strongly preferred that the defendant win is from 70% (―ordinary meaning‖) to
14
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that the defendant win and 37% of respondents who mildly preferred that the
defendant win changed sides in their judgments about which side had the better
reading when they were asked about the drafters’ intent rather than about ordinary
meaning. There is no similar change in position for respondents on the right half of
the graph—those respondents who preferred that the government win.
The result is easy enough to state. The ―drafters’ intent‖ question makes prodefendant respondents—but not pro-government respondents—more likely to draw
conclusions contrary to their policy preferences. The reason for that result is not so
clear. Perhaps there is a tendency to imagine that legislators are more aggressive
than oneself in wanting to put people in jail—that if legislators were asked which
reading they preferred, they would err on the side of finding a violation when
conduct arguably runs afoul of the statute. Whatever the explanation, it is interesting
to see evidence that judgments about ordinary meaning, at least when viewed in large
sets, aren’t quite the same as judgments about the drafters’ intent. These evidently
are experienced as related but different questions.
3. Ordinary readers
One of the most striking findings of this study is that policy preferences, as
pervasive as they are, do not infect all interpretive judgments equally, and often seem
to have little or no effect on answers to one question in particular: which reading an
ordinary reader would think best fits the ordinary meaning of the statute. We might
call that the objective form of the question about ordinary meaning, as opposed to
the subjective earlier version that asked the respondents for their own opinion about
it. When asked for a judgment about what ordinary readers would think,
respondents agreed a remarkably large share of the time. This question produces the
black lines in the charts above that sometimes are flat or nearly so, and that always
have a lesser slope than the other lines—showing in either case a much reduced
entanglement with policy preferences.
The child pornography case—the second case shown earlier—is the
strongest illustration of what effect the ―ordinary readers‖ question can have. When
respondents were asked to put aside their policy preferences and say which reading
they thought best fit the ordinary meaning of the statute, 85% of those who strongly
preferred that the government win as a matter of policy also said that the
government’s reading was better (or was ―probably better‖). But when respondents
were asked which reading ordinary readers would think a better fit to the text, only
37% of those who strongly wanted the government to win chosen the government’s
reading. On the other side of the spectrum, of those who strongly preferred that the
defendant win as a matter of policy, only 11% preferred the government’s reading
(or ―probably‖ preferred it) on their own account. But when asked which
interpretation ordinary readers would likely think correct, the number favoring the
56% (―drafters’ intent‖), a change of 14%. The shift for respondents who mildly preferred that the
defendant win is from 65% (―ordinary meaning‖) to 48% (―drafters’ intent‖), a change of 17%.
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government’s reading rose to 40%. A final way to see the point compares the range
between the answers that different responsdents gave to different questions. Those
considering the child pornography problem were asked the ―ordinary readers‖
question, all groups of respondents, regardless of their policy preferences, favored
the defendant’s reading from 57%-63% of the time. When simply asked to judge for
themselves which reading is better, the numbers choosing the defendant’s reading
ranged from 16%-89%, depending on the policy preference they reported. In short,
asking what ordinary readers would think the statute meant made the respondents
much more likely to give an answer that went against their rooting interests,
whatever they were.
We should add two caveats. First, the ―ordinary readers‖ question does not
produce such a strong two-way shift in every case. In the gun use case, for example,
most of the shifting is one-way. People who favor the government as a matter of
policy are likely to shift to a judgment in favor of the defendant’s reading, but there
is only a little movement the other way. Most of those who prefer the defendant as a
matter of policy continue to say that the defendant’s reading is what ordinary readers
would think correct. Nevertheless, all respondents do come to general agreement in
their answers, despite continued disagreement on the policy question. The gun use
case seems to be an unusual one where the question about what ordinary readers
would think produces an especially high level of agreement that the defendant is
right, and so calls for no movement by those who are rooting for defendant on
policy grounds. The three other cases considered in this Article all produce a twoway shift when the ―ordinary readers‖ question is asked.
Second, asking what ordinary readers would think is not a cure-all for the
influence of policy preference on interpretive judgments. In some cases that
question does seem to wipe out the influence entirely, but in others it merely reduces
the influence of preferences by comparison to its influence on other questions.
Notice, for example, that in the false statements and attorney’s fees cases, the
―ordinary readers‖ line has a rather steep slope. Indeed, it is steeper than the slope
of the line produced in the gun use case when respondents there are asked about the
ordinary meaning of the text. In other words, asking about ―ordinary readers‖ in the
one case is worse (from the standpoint of contamination by policy preference) than
asking any question in the other case. But that just shows that some cases produce
policy preferences that are especially hard to contain. The fact remains that in any
given case, asking what ordinary readers would think the text means always does a
better job than any other question yet found of producing an answer that is
independent of policy judgments.
Why does asking what ordinary readers would think do more to filter out
bias than questions about the drafters’ intent or the likely views of a judge? It may
be that thinking about what ordinary readers would say directs one’s attention to an
external benchmark—the purely conventional meaning of the words—and that the
attention is thus distracted from its concerns about outcomes. It may also be the
case that answers become biased when the questions have any sort of aspirational
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quality. The ―ordinary meaning‖ question asked which reading the respondent
thought was better. The question about drafters’ intent invited the respondents to
think about what someone else would have wanted—but the someone else wasn’t
just anyone. It was a legislator, a faceless but easily idealized author of the text who
the respondents might easily imagine has about the same way of looking at things
than they do. And the same could be said of the questions that asked what a court
would likely do. This time the respondent is asked to imagine how a judge would
read the language, and again the judge is a generic but idealized figure onto whom
good sense—that is, policy preferences—can readily be projected.
When they are asked what ordinary readers of English would think the text
means, it may be that something like the opposite movement occurs. The
respondents are asked to imagine what would be thought by a population a little
duller than they are: mere ordinary readers, not the better-than-average readers that
most people likely feel themselves to be. (It would be surprising if any respondents
thought of themselves as worse than ordinary.) So when they think about how
ordinary readers would interpret the law, the respondents are looking due sideways
or slightly down. ―Ordinary readers? Well, I suppose they would just think X.‖ The
inner experience, on this speculation, is that the reading is being ―dumbed down‖ a
little when one wonders what an ordinary reader would think. But the dumbing
down, if that’s what it is, is useful in an unexpected way, because it strains out a lot
of the wishful thinking that spoils mental inquiries made with a more upwardlooking angle.
These results are consistent with earlier work in which we examined judgments
about whether a text is ambiguous.16 In that study we found that respondents with
strong policy preferences about a case were much less likely to find the statute at
issue to be ambiguous—assuming they were simply asked for their opinion on that
question. But when they were asked whether an ordinary reader of English would
likely find the statute ambiguous, their judgments came loose from their preferences
in much like the way we see here.17 The difference is that in the prior study we were
talking just about threshold judgments of whether a statute fairly admits of two
interpretations—an important question in statutory cases, but still separate from the
final and substantive question of what the statute means. In this study we have
extended the inquiry to that substantive question of statutory meaning, and we find
the impact of asking an ―external‖ or ―objective‖ question even more profound here
than it was with respect to ambiguity.
B. The influence of preferences on predictions
After the gun use and attorneys’ fees cases, we asked respondents to predict
which reading a court would prefer. As Figures 4 and 5 illustrate, their answers
See Ward Farnsworth, Dustin Guzior, and Anup Malani, Ambiguity About Ambiguity:
Empirical Inquiry into Legal Interpretation, 2 J. Leg. Anal. 1 (2010).
17 Id. at XX.
16
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tracked their policy preferences. The results were confirmed by regression analysis,
as reported in Table 2. They were also the same in one other case that appears in the
appendix. Again, we had speculated that asking what someone else—a judge—
would think about the statute might help the respondents give an answer that was
independent of their own preferences. It did not. In a way parallel to what we
suggested when considering drafters’ intent, it may be that respondents project their
preferences onto judges when they imagine them interpreting a text.
These results may shed a bit of light on why some lawsuits fail to settle. A
typical settlement is based on overlapping predictions the two sides make about how
a court will decide a case. To the extent those predictions are bound up with
preferences about the outcome, they are likely to diverge and shrink the bargaining
range between the parties.

Gun Use
Government

Court vote

Probably
Government

Probably
Defendant

Ordinary meaning
Drafters' intent
Ordinary readers

Defendant
Defendant

Probably
Defendant

Probably
Government

Government

Policy preference

Figure 5. Correlation between policy preference and prediction in the gun use case.
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Attorney's Fees
Government

Court vote

Probably
Government

Probably
Defendant

Ordinary meaning
Drafters' intent
Ordinary readers

Defendant
Defendant

Probably
Defendant

Probably
Government

Government

Policy preference

Figure 6. Correlation between policy preference and prediction in the attorneys' fees case.
Table 2. Regression analysis of correlation between policy preference and prediction.
Attorney's Fees
Gun use
Constant
Ordinary meaning
Drafters' intent
Policy preference
Preference x Ordinary meaning
Preference x Drafters' intent
Number of observations

2.160***

2.044***

(0.190)

(0.162)

-0.029

0.222

(0.271)

(0.231)

0.006

0.099

(0.266)

(0.220)

0.157**

0.182***

(0.072)

(0.065)

0.016

-0.033

(0.108)

(0.090)

0.017

-0.049

(0.102)

(0.090)
505

Adjusted R2
440
0.034
Note. Regression of answers to interpretative question (1 to 4, with 4 most
pro-government) on indicators for framing of interpretive question, policy
preference (1 to 4, with 4 most pro-government), and preference interacted
with framing indicators. Robust standard errors reported below coefficients.
***/**/* indicate p < 0.01/0.05/0.1.
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III. IMPLICATIONS
Once we see the advantages of asking what ordinary readers would think a
text means, further questions become apparent. First, even if answers to the
―ordinary readers‖ question are untainted by bias, how relevant are those answers as
a legal matter? Second, all worries about bias to one side, how accurate are the
answers that respondents give when they predict what ordinary readers would think?
This section addresses those two issues.
To begin with the first question, of course there are well-developed schools
of thought about the goals of statutory interpretation, and it might seem possible to
link some of them to choices in our survey instruments. We could suppose that
when we ask which reading better comports with the drafters’ intent, we are inviting
the respondents to act like ―intentionalists‖ or ―purposivists.‖18 And when we ask
what ordinary readers of the statute would say it means, we are inviting the
respondents to act like textualists—or one variety of textualist, anyway. But this
picture doesn’t do justice to those schools of interpretive thought. Most interpreters
of statutes nowadays are likely to regard judges as agents of the legislature; they differ
mostly in what evidence of legislative intent they think proper to consider.19
Obviously a good intentionalist and a good textualist will both want a lot more
material to work with than anyone received in our surveys. The respondents had no
basis for comment on the legislature’s purpose except their own speculations, and
they didn’t have all the materials bearing on ―semantic context‖ that a textualist
would want them to have.
So nothing we have found or said here strikes a great blow for any one
theory of interpretation against another. But the findings are suggestive and do
allow some recommendations of emphasis. Asking what an ordinary reader would
think a statute means is an important part of one kind of textualism. It is the type
that puts an especially high priority on the public meaning of a law. Justice Scalia is a
frequent advocate of this approach to interpretation, and often resorts to arguments
about statutes that are based on what an ordinary person might think a statute
means.20 The general theory behind the argument is that people are entitled to notice
of what the law is, so a statute should be taken to mean just what it would mean to
an ordinary reader. Letting it mean anything else sets a trap and offends the rule of
law. This reasoning is especially powerful in criminal cases, where the defendant’s

See Manning, supra note XX; Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial
Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1833, 1834-35 (1998).
19 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Judges as Honest Agents, 33 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y. 915 (2010); Abbe R.
Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified
Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750 (2010); Adrian Vermeule, Foreward: System Effects and the Constitution, 123
Harv. L. Rev. 4, 64-65 (2009).
20 See Scalia, supra note XX at __; John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 Va. L. Rev. 419
(2005).
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interest in notice—that is, in knowing before one acts what is criminal and what is
not—seems especially important.21 The gun use case is a good example.
This study allows us to suggest another point in favor of asking what
ordinary readers would think a statute means, and giving weight to the answer. That
question is better than other common questions about meaning at producing
answers that aren’t contaminated by underlying policy preferences. It may or may
not be the question one would most like to have answered about a statute; but a
modest question that can be answered relatively well might be better than a perfect
question that will tend to be answered badly.
Our second question was whether the respondents to our surveys, even
without bias from their policy preferences, were correct in their statements about what
an ordinary reader would think a statute means? This is surprisingly difficult to
answer, even if we assume that those who took our surveys are themselves ordinary
readers. It might seem then that we could then look at their views of what these
statutes meant, use the results of that inquiry to decide what ordinary readers in fact
think, and then compare those findings to what our respondents predicted ordinary
readers would think. But not so fast. Which of their answers should be used to
show what ordinary readers ―really‖ think? We wouldn’t want to use everyone’s
answers to the ―ordinary readers‖ question, because that doesn’t show what they
thought the statute meant. It shows what they expected others to think it meant. We
could just look at what our respondents said when they were asked which reading of
the statute they thought was better. But then we get answers heavily biased by policy
preferences—the red line in our graph [assuming we choose that color]. That spoils
the inquiry, for a good prediction of what ordinary readers would think of a text isn’t
supposed to be a prediction of where their biases would lead them. We would end
up with a paradox in which opinions about what ordinary readers are valuable
because they are unbiased—but also wrong because they are unbiased.
The root problem is that when we ask what an ordinary reader would think a
text means, we would like to check the answer against the views of ordinary readers
who don’t have policy preferences that get in the way of their judgments. It is
doubtful whether any such readers are out there. That is one of the implications of
this study. One could try setting a baseline by asking some random population of
reader what they think a chunk of language means—―using a firearm,‖ perhaps—
without any indication of why the question is being asked (in other words, without
mentioning any legal case). But then the respondents are being forced to interpret
the words without a context, and that is a different activity than interpreting them in
the particular settings that appeared in our questions. In the end, we suggest that
what ordinary readers would think only sounds like an empirical question. It really is
not. The ordinary reader is an idealized creature, perhaps not unlike the reasonable
person who juries are instructed to imagine in tort cases. Thinking about the
See Farnsworth et al., supra note XX, at 23; Note, Textualism as Fair Notice, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 542
(2009).
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ordinary reader is best understood just as a thought experiment, or heuristic. It is a
useful device for getting oneself to think a certain way about a text—to focus on the
conventional meaning of the words.
IV. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
A. Causation
At times in this paper we have spoken of mere ―entanglement‖ between
policy preferences and judgments about what a text means. That way of speaking
implies no causation. At other points, though, we have talked of policy preferences
―influencing‖ interpretive judgments or having an effect on them. Those claims do
suggest causation, of course, so we should consider whether they are hasty. Instead
of policy wishes influencing judgments about the text, could judgments about the
text somehow be influencing policy wishes?
This is not likely. The policy preferences that respondents display remain the
same regardless of what interpretive questions they are asked; but as we have seen,
the answers to the interpretive questions sometimes closely follow those preferences
and sometimes do not. The causal link we suggest is supported by similar findings in
studies of wishful thinking22 or ―halo effects‖23 in non-legal settings. These studies
show how underlying preferences about outcomes or similar sources of biases
frequently influence judgments about facts, and not the other way around. Our
results can be viewed as a particular application of that same general observation.
B. Criminal cases
Most of the case studies in our surveys involved federal criminal law. It is
possible that the effects found here are special to criminal matters, and would not
carry over to civil cases—but again, it is not likely. To address this possibility, we
included a non-criminal case that involved an award of attorney’s fees at the end of a
civil action. As Figure 4 illustrated, respondents displayed the same general pattern
in their choices about those cases that they did in the criminal situations, though the
effects were somewhat weaker and the pro-government effect surrounding ―drafters’
intent‖ does not arise. That last point lends a bit of support to our earlier conjecture
that respondents tend to think of the ―drafters‖ as pro-government or more eager to
put people in jail. In the civil context, the government is not trying to put someone

See Jon Elster, Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions 20-21 (1999); Thomas
Gilovich, How We Know What Isn't So: The Fallibility of Human Reason in Everyday Life 75-87
(1991).
23 See Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy De Camp Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports
on Mental Processes, 84 Psychol. Rev. 231, 231-32 (1977); Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy De Camp
Wilson, The Halo Effect: Evidence for Unconscious Alteration of Judgments, 35 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol.
250, 250-52 (1977).
22

20

in jail, and it would be surprising to find that respondents thought of the ―drafters‖
as preferring the plaintiff over the defendant, or the other way around.
C. External validity
The respondents to most of the questions we have discussed here were
students in their first semester of law school. It is possible, of course, that the
effects we found are less pronounced among lawyers and judges. But we doubt this
on two grounds. First, in prior rounds of this research we did administer our surveys
to students at the start and end of their first year of law school. Those surveys did
not include the ―ordinary readers‖ question, but they did include other questions
considered here—questions about policy preference, about which readings were
more consistent with the statute’s purpose, and which reading of the statute was
better as a matter of text. We found the same results in both populations; there was
no significant difference.24 If a year of law school has not made a dent in the
tendency of preferences to influence interpretive judgments, then that tendency is
likely stubborn enough to keep exerting some influence later in life. Even if the
overall effects were reduced in strength, there is no reason to suppose that the relative
effects of the different questions we asked would be changed. Asking what an
ordinary reader would think of a text would still be a better question than others,
even if the benefit in the reduction of bias is less among judges than it is among
others.
But in any event we are skeptical about any reduction of these tendencies at
all in judges. Consider the relationship between the findings shown here and the
following charts, adapted from an earlier empirical study of judicial behavior
conducted by one of the authors of this article.25 Figure 7 is based on career data for
all of Supreme Court Justices from 1953-2004.26 One line shows how often each
Justice voted for the government in nonunanimous criminal cases involving
constitutional claims. The other line shows their votes in nonunanimous criminal
cases depending on some nonconstitutional source of law—usually a statute or rule.
The Justices are ordered here according to the data (i.e., by the mean of the two
lines) to show the alignment between the two trends.
We can also view the comparison by removing the Justices’ names from the
graph and instead putting their votes in constitutional cases along the bottom and
their votes in nonconstitutional cases along the side. This gives us Figure 8, a
scatterplot of the same data that correlates the proportion of the Justices’ votes for
the government in nonunanimous criminal cases of the two types—constitutional
and not. An increase in the share of votes for the government along one of the
See Farnsworth et al., supra note XX, at ___.
Ward Farnsworth, Signatures of Ideology: The Case of the Supreme Court’s Criminal Docket, 104 Mich. L.
Rev. 67 (2005).
26 The data were derived from the United States Supreme Court Judicial Database at Michigan State
University. For more details and discussion, see Farnsworth, supra note XX, n. 7.
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dimensions is very likely to mean an increase along the other. A fitted line shows a
strong linear relationship between decisions in favor of the government in either
situation.27
These charts show that any given Justice votes for the government about as
often in cases involving the Constitution as in cases that involve other sources of law.
Why should that be? No known theory of interpretation would cause a judge to cast
similar votes in cases that depend on entirely different sorts of legal texts. And while
originalism, as a constitutional theory, might be expected to produce rulings friendly
to the government (because defendants often want the protections of the bill of
rights expanded beyond their original meaning), it is hard to see why textualism,
intentionalism, or any other approach to interpreting statutes would have similar
effects. These questions are explored more fully in the earlier work that produced
the charts, but the study presented in this article makes a helpful new contribution to
an understanding of them.
Chart 1: How often U.S. Supreme Court Justices have voted for the government
in nonunanimous criminal cases since 1953.
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Figure 7

The Pearson Correlation Coefficient (R) is an extremely high .94, accounting for 88% of the
variance (R2).
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Chart 2: U.S. Supreme Court Justices' Votes for the Government in
Constitutional Cases by Nonconstitutional Cases, 1953-2002

% Pro-Government Votes in Nonconstitutional Criminal Cases

.

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
R=.94

50%
40%
30%
20%
10%

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

0%

% Pro-Government Votes in Constitutional Criminal Cases

Figure 8

Nonunanimous criminal cases in the Supreme Court are precisely the ones
where the legal materials are not conclusive on their face. They contain ambiguities
and call for interpretation; most of the cases that served as the basis for questions in
our surveys are represented in the set of non-constitutional cases graphed above.
Our hypothesis is that when confronted with ambiguous texts—statutes, of course,
but probably also cases and constitutional provisions—judges, like other people,
have trouble stopping their policy preferences from influencing their judgments.
Those policy preferences cut across all sorts of criminal cases, and aren’t sensitive to
the particular type of legal material (statute, case law, etc.) on which the case seems
to depend. In short, when judges vote for the government about as often in close
criminal cases of every kind, it is partly because they acting much like the
respondents to our surveys.
Obviously this is not a complete explanation of the data just shown. Some
judicial votes are better explained in other ways that do not involve the bias exerted
by policy preferences. But the purpose of this discussion is not to settle the reasons
for judicial dispute. It is to add to the ways that disputes can be explained. The
charts just shown are offered here merely to cast doubt on the suggestion that judges
are immune to the influences of policy preference that this study has illustrated. The
evidence of judicial behavior does not suggest any such immunity. That behavior
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shows patterns, rather, that are hard to explain without resort to theories and
evidence of the kind we offer here.
CONCLUSION
Policy preferences strongly infect people’s judgments about the ordinary
meaning of an ambiguous legal text. They also infect judgments about the drafters’
intent and predictions of what a court would think the text means. They do not
infect nearly as much—sometimes they do not affect at all—judgments about what
an ordinary reader of the text would think it means. There are various arguments to
be made for and against putting legal weight on that last ―objective‖ question. This
Article adds to the arguments in favor of it. The objective question is much easier to
answer without bias from policy preferences.
How fully these findings can be applied to judges is an open question, but
they help explain a lot of judicial behavior that otherwise is hard to understand.
Judges, or for that matter anyone else, can easily decide that they won’t let their
policy preferences affect their decisions about what a text means. This study
suggests that effectively carrying out that decision is harder than it seems. The
subjective inner sense that one’s preferences are out of the way can be very
convincing. That subjective inner sense is a fairly accomplished con artist.
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